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WILL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS
SURVIVE?
Melissa Hart*
For more than 30 years, employment discrimination cases have
typified the sort of civil rights action that courts and commentators
describe as uniquely suited to resolution by class action litigation. As
the Supreme Court recognized in 1977, “suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their nature class suits, involving classwide
wrongs.”1 When Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs
private class litigation in federal court, was amended in 1966, the
Federal Rules advisory committee observed that civil rights actions were
particularly appropriate for resolution under one of its provisions.2 Of
course, support of the class action as a means for resolving employment
discrimination disputes was never universal. But until the 1990s, critics
of the class action were, by and large, overshadowed by its supporters in
the context of employment disputes. That has started to change,
however, and the increasing skepticism – particularly among members
of the federal judiciary – toward the class action as an effective disputeresolution mechanism in the employment context is beginning to take its
toll.
Some of this increasing skepticism may be explained by significant
changes in the law of employment discrimination. Specifically, when
Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with its
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it granted to litigants certain
substantive rights that have had significant, most likely unintended,
procedural consequences for litigants. By permitting victims of alleged
intentional discrimination to seek compensatory and punitive damages
*
Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to thank Joel
Dion for his research assistance and Kevin Traskos for his helpful comments.
1. E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b), Advisory Committee Notes (“Illustrative [of a (b)(2) class] are
various actions in the civil rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully
against a class . . . .”).
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and by granting a right to a jury trial,3 Congress complicated the analysis
of the appropriateness of class certification in the employment
discrimination context. The combination of these doctrinal changes with
shifting attitudes towards class action litigation more generally is casting
serious doubt in some minds on the continued viability of the
employment discrimination class action in federal court.4
This paper will argue that the changes wrought by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 do not in fact pose a barrier to resolution of employment
discrimination claims through class litigation.
The addition of
compensatory and punitive damages and a jury-trial right in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 may increase the level of scrutiny and perhaps the
level of judicial involvement necessary in an employment discrimination
class action. But they do not render such a class action either
impermissible under Rule 23 or violative of due process or Seventh
Amendment jury trial rights. Courts and commentators who insist that
these changes are fatal to certification of employment discrimination
classes are incorrect. The strength of their conviction, however, raises
the question whether other factors might be motivating the hostility
confronting employment class certification.
Section I of this paper will consider the pre-1991 Title VII class
action, and the main concerns that courts focused on in determining
whether to certify these classes. Section II will describe the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the potential pitfalls this new law created for the
Title VII class action, and how courts have responded to these concerns.
This section will argue that neither the new remedies nor the jury trial
right that Congress added to Title VII provides sufficient justification to
deny certification in most employment discrimination class actions.
Procedures that have long been available to judges under Rule 23 –
particularly judicial oversight and management of the class proceedings
as well as bifurcation of class-specific and individual liability issues –
are appropriate to protect against potential constitutional violations.
Section III will argue that courts now refusing to certify class actions in
the employment context are motivated in substantial part by other
concerns: a widely credited notion that class actions in general are

3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) – (c) (2000).
4. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407-410 (5th Cir. 1998); Zachery
v. Texaco Exploration & Prod. Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1999); Harvey S. Bartlett III,
Determining Whether a Title VII Plaintiff Class’s “Aim is True”: The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp. for Employment Discrimination Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUL.
L. REV. 2163, 2186 (2000); Gary M. Kramer, No Class: Post-1991 Barriers to Rule 23 Certification
of Across-the-Board Employment Discrimination Cases, 15 LAB. LAW. 415, 454-55 (2000).
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unfair; the perception that employment discrimination class actions are
no longer necessary for full enforcement of civil rights; and a deep
uncertainty about the merits of certain claims being pursued in
employment discrimination suits today.
I. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS
ACTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, sex, religion and national origin.5 The
Act prohibits discrimination in individual employment decisions as well
as employer policies or patterns of conduct that discriminate broadly
against members of protected groups.6 And it gives employees two
possible causes of action. The first is for disparate treatment claims, in
which the plaintiffs allege that an employer intentionally discriminated
against a member or members of a protected group. The second is for
disparate impact claims, in which plaintiffs allege that an employer’s
facially neutral policies have a discriminatory effect on a protected
group and the employer cannot justify the policies by business
necessity.7
Just two years after the Civil Rights Act became law, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were amended. Perhaps the most important of
the 1966 amendments was the creation of the modern Rule 23, which
governs the certification of class actions in federal court. Rule 23 sets
up a two-part certification inquiry. In order to bring a suit as a class
action, plaintiffs must demonstrate first that they can meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a). To meet this standard, plaintiffs must show
that the number of class members is sufficient to render traditional
joinder of the claims impracticable; that the claims of the putative class
members share common legal or factual questions; that the claims of the
named plaintiffs are typical of the claims of absent class members; and
that the named plaintiffs and their attorneys are adequate representatives
for the class.8

5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000)).
6. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977);
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (“We begin by repeating the observation
of earlier decisions that in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin.”).
7. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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After a court has determined that a proposed class meets these
threshold requirements, the class can only be certified if it fits one of the
circumstances described in Rule 23(b): 1) prosecution of individual suits
would create the risk of inconsistent or conflicting resolution; 2) the
defendant has acted or failed to act on grounds applicable to the class as
a whole, such that injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate; or 3)
common questions predominate over individual questions, and
maintenance of the suit as a class is superior to other possible methods
of adjudication.9 Employment discrimination classes have traditionally
been certified under 23(b)(2) because they typically involve a request by
a group of plaintiffs that the defendant employer be enjoined from
further discriminatory conduct.10 Indeed, the advisory committee notes
to Rule 23(b)(2) explicitly state that civil rights cases are particularly
appropriate for resolution under that provision.11 Employment classes
have also been certified under 23(b)(3). This provision of Rule 23 is the
most controversial, as it provides a mechanism for certifying classes that
lack the clear cohesiveness of (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. Because
23(b)(3) is a kind of “catch-all” for more ambiguous class claims, the
Rule imposes a number of additional procedural hurdles on the 23(b)(3)
class. In order to certify a (b)(3) class, a court must conclude that
questions common to the class predominate over any individual
questions and that class litigation would be the superior method for
resolving the claim. In addition, the court must ensure that all members
of a (b)(3) class receive notice and an opportunity to opt out of the class
litigation.12 Because of these additional hurdles, and because they have
always been viewed as prototypical (b)(2) suits, employment claims
under (b)(3) were traditionally more unusual.
The operation of Title VII and Rule 23 together has allowed large
groups of employees to challenge broadly discriminatory employer
policies. Indeed, since the late 1960s, private class action suits have
been perhaps the most important means for challenging and eliminating
systemic employment discrimination, one of the principal goals of Title
VII. The framework for these systemic challenges is a two-step process
most famously explained by the Supreme Court in International

9. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
10. See 8 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 24:81, at
315 (4th ed. 2003) (“The aptness of designating employment discrimination suits as class actions
under Rule 23(b)(2) has been recognized repeatedly and definitively by the courts.”).
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
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Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.13 During the first phase –
which the Court referred to as the “liability” phase – the plaintiffs have
the initial burden of proving a prima facie case, which requires them to
show “more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ or
sporadic discriminatory acts. [They must] establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard
operating procedure, the regular rather than the unusual practice.”14
Plaintiffs can use both statistical and anecdotal evidence to meet this
burden. The defendant then can seek to rebut the prima facie case by
demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ evidence is “inaccurate or
insignificant,” such that it does not establish the existence of a pattern of
discrimination.15 If the fact-finder determines that the plaintiffs have
made out a prima facie case and that their case has withstood the
defendant’s challenge, “a trial court may then conclude that a violation
has occurred and determine the appropriate remedy.”16 At that point,
without any further evidence from the plaintiffs, the finding of a pattern
of discrimination will justify an award of prospective relief such as an
injunction against further discrimination or other order necessary to
ensure the protection of the plaintiffs’ rights under Title VII.17
The second phase of a Teamsters-style litigation will consider the
scope of additional relief available to individual members of the class.
This “remedial” stage of the trial addresses whether individual class
members are entitled to back pay, front pay or reinstatement, depending
on the evidence presented by each class member seeking these
damages.18 The Teamsters Court explained that a conclusion in the first
phase of the litigation that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination created a rebuttable presumption that
discrimination had motivated the employment decision with regard to
13. 431 U.S. 324, 360-62 (1977). Teamsters involved a pattern-or-practice suit filed by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which does not have to comply with the requirements
of Rule 23. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980). However,
Teamsters adopted the standard from Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 751 (1976), which was a Rule 23
class action. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 347. Moreover, the Teamsters framework has been applied in
private class actions under Rule 23. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 10, § 24:124, at 485 (“The
majority of courts have held the bifurcation of class liability and relief phases of Title VII suits to be
an appropriate means of litigating employment discrimination claims.”).
14. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336.
15. Id. at 360.
16. Id. at 361.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 361-62. As discussed infra note 33 and accompanying text, after the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, it is also at this point that individual plaintiffs might address their entitlement to
punitive or compensatory damages.
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each individual plaintiff.19 Thus, during this second phase, the defendant
carries the burden of demonstrating that, in any individual case, the
adverse employment action was not the result of discrimination.20 Prior
to 1991, no jury was required in Title VII litigation, so a court would
serve as fact-finder in both the class-wide liability and the individualized
remedial phases of the litigation.
When class actions first became a popular means for challenging
employers’ long-standing and deeply rooted discriminatory policies,
many lower courts were flexible about their adherence to the strict
requirements of Rule 23(a) in assessing whether to certify a class of
employees.21 During the 1960s and early 1970s, courts certified many
so-called “across-the-board” class action suits.22 In these suits, plaintiffs
who were members of a protected class would seek to represent all
members of that class in all of their various possible relationships with
the employer. Thus, for example, a Mexican-American employee who
had been denied a promotion, allegedly because of his race, would seek
to represent not only a class of all Mexican-American employees who
had been denied promotions, but also all Mexican-American employees
who had not been hired at all. 23 The asserted rationale for certifying
these claims was that all of the employer’s policies were tainted by
racism, and that any covered employee or group of employees might
therefore challenge the full range of policies and practices.
But Rule 23(a)’s requirements of commonality, typicality and
19. Id. at 362.
20. Id.
21. See Charles Mishkind, Alison Marshall & Walter Connolly, The Big Risks: Class Actions
and Pattern and Practice Cases, 591 PUB. LAW INST. 329, 338 (1998) (“Prior to 1977, employment
discrimination lawsuits were routinely certified as class actions based on the rationale that such
claims were inherently of a class nature, and presumptively appropriate for class certification.”).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969) (“While
it is true, as the lower court points out, that there are different factual questions with regard to
different employees, it is also true that the ‘Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy
hangs over the racial class (and) is a question of fact common to all members of the class.’”). This
case is widely recognized as the first to discuss and sanction the “across-the-board” theory of class
certification in an employment discrimination case. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476,
1484 (11th Cir. 1987). Many other courts of appeals followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead. See, e.g.,
Gibson v. Local 40, International Longshoreman’s and Warehouseman’s Union, 543 F.2d 1259,
1263-64 (9th Cir. 1976); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1976); Senter v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Rich v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547
(4th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arlington Hotel, Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 854 (1973).
23. This is the fact pattern that the lower courts approved, but that the Supreme Court found
insufficient to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), in General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/5

6

Hart: Employment Discrimination Class Actions
HART4.DOC

2004]

5/14/2004 10:33 AM

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS

819

adequacy require a tighter connection between the claims of the named
plaintiffs and those of the absent class members they seek to represent.
In 1982, the Supreme Court reversed just such a broad class
certification, sharply criticizing employment discrimination class actions
charging employers with “across-the-board” discrimination. In General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon,24 the Supreme Court recognized “that racial
discrimination is by definition class discrimination,” but held that this
fact did not mean that an allegation of racial discrimination could in
itself answer the questions posed by the requirements of Rule 23.
Conceptually there is a wide gap between (a) an individual’s claim that
he has been denied a promotion on discriminatory grounds and his
otherwise unsupported allegation that the company has a policy of
discrimination, and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have
suffered the same injury as that individual, such that the individual’s
claim and the class claims will share common questions of law or fact
and that the individual’s claim will be typical of the class claims.25

The Court cautioned that the existence of a generalized claim of
discrimination was insufficient to support certification under Rule 23(a)
and that the named representatives would have to demonstrate that their
claims were typical of the class claims in more than simply the
allegation of discriminatory motivation. The Rule 23(a) requirements
ensure that the named plaintiffs are truly representative – and truly
representing – those absent class members whose rights would be
resolved without their actual presence in the courtroom. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that a private Title VII class action “may only be
certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”26
Since Falcon, courts have been strict in requiring that named
plaintiffs in an employment discrimination class action share certain
relevant characteristics with absent class members in order to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a). For example, named plaintiffs who have
suffered discrimination in hiring may not represent a class of individuals
who claim discriminatory failure to promote or discriminatory discharge.
Courts have reasoned that the differences between not being hired for a
24. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
25. Id. at 157. The court made a similar point in East Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977) (“We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic
discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common
questions of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable.”).
26. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.
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position and being fired or being passed over for promotion are
substantial enough that the named plaintiff’s claims in such a scenario
would not be “typical” of other class members’ claims.27 The failure to
meet Rule 23(a)’s “typicality” requirement would also call into question
whether a named plaintiff could provide adequate representation for the
class. For the same reasons, a class of plaintiffs composed of current
employees of a company is unlikely to adequately represent
unsuccessful applicants for employment. A possible exception to these
general rules was recognized in Falcon itself, where the Court noted that
“significant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and
employees if the discrimination manifested itself in the same general
fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes.”28
In the years after the Court emphasized the importance of
adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the number of class action
suits filed in federal court decreased significantly. While 1174 class
action employment discrimination cases were filed in federal court in
1976, only 32 such cases were filed in 1991.29 That number slowly
increased during the 1990s,30 and in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
number of employment class actions filed annually ranged from a high
of 85 (in 1997-98 and 1998-99) to a low of 73 (in 2000-2001 and 20012002).31

27. See, e.g., Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1486-87 (11th Cir. 1987); Sanchez v. City of
Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 1990). Of course a group of named plaintiffs might
include one who was fired and one who was denied promotion, and the proposed class might
include individuals subject to both adverse actions.
28. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
29. Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Discrimination
Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925, 926 (2001).
30. See Richard T. Seymour, Trends in Fair Employment Litigation, Midwinter Meeting of the
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP (Mar. 25, 1998).
31. See 2003 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS ANN. REP., at tbl.X-5 at http://www.uscourts.
gov/judbus2003/appendices/x5.pdf. These increasing numbers are widely thought to be a
consequence at least in part of the enhanced remedies made available in the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See, e.g., Shively, supra note 29, at 926; Mishkind et al., supra note 21, at 411-412; Kramer,
supra note 4, at 415 & n.1. The increasing number of class actions filed in the late 1990s and early
2000s may also be explained by the EEOC’s decision to “[make] it a priority to route out systemic
discrimination.” Mishkind et al., supra note 21, at 412. In 1997, the EEOC General Counsel stated
that “the Agency would be filing ‘dramatically more class actions than in the past.’” Id. (quoting
General Counsel Stewart Predicts More Litigation, Class Cases from Agency, 1997 EEOC DAILY
LAB. REP. C-1 (April 1, 1997)).
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II. CLASS ACTION LITIGATION AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Prior to 1991, successful Title VII plaintiffs could recover back and
front pay, but were not entitled to other money damages.32 In 1991,
finding that “additional remedies under Federal law are needed to
deter . . . intentional discrimination in the workplace,” Congress made
punitive and compensatory damages available to plaintiffs claiming
intentional discrimination.33 For these intentional discrimination claims,
Congress also provided that either party was entitled to request a jury
trial.34 Both the additional damages provisions and the jury trial right
have led courts and numerous commentators to debate about the
continued viability of class litigation in claims alleging intentional
discrimination. This Part will begin by exploring the arguments
surrounding the impact of punitive and compensatory damages on class
certification in employment cases, and will then briefly discuss the
debate about the impact of the right to a jury trial on certification of a
class. I conclude that in both instances the detractors of the continued
potential for employment class litigation have dramatically overstated
the effects of the changes wrought by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
A. Compensatory and Punitive Damages
Those who view the 1991 Civil Rights Act as dooming class
litigation of cases alleging intentional discrimination argue that the
addition of compensatory and punitive damages has diminished the
group nature of these claims. These increased damages, argue some,
make litigation of employment claims less about changing the behavior
of the employer and more about compensating individual plaintiffs. By
shifting the focus in this manner, the argument goes, the new remedies
have made it difficult, if not impossible, for plaintiffs to fit their
proposed class into any of the Rule 23(b) categories.
The best-known articulation of this view is the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., in which the majority
essentially concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had sufficiently

32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000). Successful plaintiffs were also entitled to declaratory
and injunctive relief, id., and could recover attorney’s fees, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000). Plaintiffs challenging an employer’s facially neutral
policy for its disparate impact are not entitled to these new damages. Id. The total amount of
punitive and compensatory damages available to a plaintiff depends on the size of the employer,
with the maximum combined damages set at $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A)-(D).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
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changed the landscape of Title VII so that claims under the Act could no
longer be brought as class actions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.35 The focus on Allison derives in part from the fact that it
was the first appellate decision on the relationship between Rule 23 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and in part from the starkness of the
court’s conclusions. The Fifth Circuit found that “[b]efore the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which for the first time provided
plaintiffs with a right to compensatory and punitive damages as well as a
jury trial (each demanded here), aspects of this case clearly would have
qualified for class certification.”36 However, the court went on to
conclude, the plaintiffs’ newly earned civil rights “ultimately render this
case unsuitable for class certification under Rule 23.”37
The court in Allison was confronted with over 130 named plaintiffs
and intervenors, filing suit on behalf of more than 1000 black employees
and applicants for employment at Citgo. The plaintiffs alleged that the
company had engaged in discrimination with respect to hiring,
promotion, compensation and training policies at its two manufacturing
facilities in Lake Charles, Louisiana.38 The suit challenged a range of
activities including failure to post or announce job vacancies, use of an
informal, word-of-mouth process for filling job vacancies, use of racially
biased tests to evaluate candidates for hire or promotion, and use of a
subjective decision-making process by a predominantly white
supervisory staff in reviewing applications for hire and employees for
promotion.39 Plaintiffs claimed both disparate impact and disparate
treatment discrimination, and sought injunctive relief, including
restructuring of the offending policies, installment of class members into
existing positions, and retroactive seniority and benefits. In addition to
this injunctive relief, plaintiffs sought back pay, front pay, compensatory
and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs also requested a
jury trial on their claims of intentional discrimination.40 Citgo opposed
class certification and the district court declined to certify the class. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification41
Although the reviewing judges agreed that the Allison class met all
of the requirements of Rule 23(a), the Fifth Circuit concluded that the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407-10 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 407-08.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 408.
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class was not certifiable under any provision of 23(b). The court first
addressed the possibility of certification under 23(b)(2), the provision
traditionally used for employment discrimination class actions. In
analyzing this question, the majority reached two conclusions: first, that
“[t]he underlying premise of the (b)(2) class—that its members suffer
from a common injury properly addressed by class-wide relief—‘begins
to break down when the class seeks to recover back pay or other forms
of monetary relief to be allocated based on individual injuries.’”42 And
second, that “actions for class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief are
intended for (b)(2) certification precisely because they involve uniform
group remedies.”43
As to the first point, the Allison majority argued that the caution in
the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23(b)(2) that “[t]he subdivision
does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates
exclusively or predominantly to money damages”44 should be
understood as a concern about the cohesiveness of the class. Further, the
court argued it is reasonable to apply a requirement that injunctive relief
predominate over any requested monetary relief in a (b)(2) action
because without this requirement the cohesiveness of the class must be
questioned. Thus, “when the monetary relief being sought is less of a
group remedy and instead depends on the varying circumstances and
merits of each potential class member’s case,” then the monetary relief
should be viewed as the predominant relief sought and, regardless of
what other relief the plaintiffs seek, the class should not be certified
under (b)(2).45 The second major prong of the Allison majority’s logic –
the notion that efficiency benefits derived from “uniform group
remedies” are a primary rationale for the existence of the (b)(2) class –
appears to be an entirely novel idea, but one that helped to support the
court’s conclusion that “(b)(2)’s predomination requirements serves two
basic purposes: first, it protects the legitimate interests of potential class
members who might wish to pursue their monetary claims individually;
and second, it preserves the legal system’s interest in judicial
economy.”46 In light of these two purposes, the majority concluded that
district courts should refuse to certify classes under 23(b)(2),
unless [monetary relief] is incidental to requested injunctive or
declaratory relief . . . . By incidental, we mean damages that flow
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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directly from liability to the class as a whole . . . . Ideally, incidental
damages should be only those to which class members automatically
would be entitled once liability to the class (or subclass) as a whole is
established.47

In the Allison court’s view, “[l]iability for incidental damages should not
require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each
individual’s case; it should neither introduce new and substantial legal or
factual issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations. Thus,
incidental damages will, by definition, be more in the nature of a group
remedy.”48
Applying this standard for evaluating the appropriateness of
certification under 23(b)(2), the court of appeals concluded that the
district court had appropriately declined to certify the proposed class
under this provision. Compensatory and punitive damages, the court
explained, both require “individualized proof of injury, including how
each class member was personally affected by the discriminatory
conduct,” and therefore cannot be described as “incidental” to the
requested injunctive relief.49 Of course, individualized determinations
are also necessary for back pay awards, which all of the federal circuit
courts, including the Fifth, had long awarded in employment
discrimination class suits certified under 23(b)(2). But the Allison
majority sidestepped this issue without much discussion by noting that
back pay is categorized as equitable relief, while punitive and
compensatory damages are legal remedies.50
After disposing of the (b)(2) certification question, the Fifth Circuit
went on to conclude that the district court appropriately declined to
certify the class as a “hybrid” of 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), in which the claims
for compensatory and punitive damages were certified under 23(b)(3)
and the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims were certified under (b)(2).51
The court of appeals explained that, for essentially the same reasons that
certification under (b)(2) was not appropriate, hybrid certification was
also correctly denied. The individualized determinations necessary for
punitive and compensatory damages claims would “predominate” over
the litigation of the common questions presented by the employer’s
allegedly discriminatory practices, and the need for this individualized
assessment would render class litigation no more manageable than
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 418-19.
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separate trials. Since 23(b)(3) requires that common issues predominate,
and that class litigation be superior to other options for disposing of the
claims, certification of the damages claims under (b)(3) would not be
appropriate. 52
The Allison court’s approach to post-1991 certification of
employment discrimination class actions represents a particularly
extreme statement of the potential problems created by the interaction of
Rule 23(b)’s requirements with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. But parts
of the opinion have been endorsed by a number of courts and
commentators. In particular, both the Seventh and the Eleventh Circuits
have adopted Allison’s “incidental” damages approach to certification
under 23(b)(2).53 A growing number of district courts have also
accepted this analysis of (b)(2) certification,54 and the provision of Rule
23 that once was considered particularly appropriate for civil rights
litigation is under attack.
But there is nothing in either Rule 23 or, certainly, in the civil rights
laws, that mandates the Allison court’s conclusions.55 Indeed, it is quite
odd to imagine that Congress, in expanding the remedies available to
civil rights plaintiffs, intended to limit the avenues available to seek
those remedies.56 To the contrary, “the 1991 legislation was clearly
conceived and passed as a pro-plaintiff measure.”57 The new law was
passed explicitly in response to several 1989 Supreme Court decisions
that were widely perceived as hostile to full enforcement of civil rights

52. Id. at 419.
53. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Murray v.
Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001).
54. See, e.g., Reap v. Continental Cas. Co., 199 F.R.D. 536, 546-48 (D.N.J. 2001); George
Lussier Enters., Inc. v. Subaru of New Eng., Inc., No. Civ. 99-109-B, 2001 WL 920060, at *20
(D.N.H. Aug. 3, 2001); Robertson v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 397 CV1216, 2000WL
33381019, at *7 (D. Conn. July 5, 2001).
55. There is no evidence, either in the statute itself, or anywhere in the legislative history, that
Congress in any way considered the impact its expansion of available remedies might have on class
action litigation. See, e.g., Daniel F. Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. REV. 305, 307 (2001). In 1972, in the context of amending
Title VII, the federal legislature emphasized that “[t]he committee agrees with the courts that title
VII actions are by their very nature class compl[aints], and that any restriction on such actions
would greatly undermine the effectiveness of title VII.” S. REP. NO. 92-415, 92nd CONG., 1st Sess.,
at 27 (1972).
56. Indeed, some have argued that the approach taken by the court in Allison “undermines the
goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” Bartlett, supra note 4, at 2186. See W. Lyle Stamps, Getting
Title VII Back on Track: Leaving Allison Behind for the Robinson Line, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 411,
444-45 (2003).
57. Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1849 (2000).
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legislation.58 Among the “findings” that precede the Act’s substantive
provisions, Congress observes that “additional remedies under Federal
law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional
discrimination in the workplace, . . . and legislation is necessary to
provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination in
employment.”59
Moreover, in providing victims of employment
discrimination the right to compensatory and punitive damages under
Title VII, Congress was simply offering remedies that had long been
available under other civil rights laws. Specifically, the 1991 Act was
intended to bring Title VII’s remedial provisions in line with those of
Section 1981, a post-Civil War enactment that protects against race
discrimination.60 Plaintiffs had been successfully seeking compensatory
and punitive damages in class action suits under Section 1981 for
years,61 so it seems at best unlikely that Congress perceived these awards
as inconsistent with Rule 23.
Congressional intent to the side, the Allison court’s analysis of the
reasons for and benefits of permitting certification of classes under
23(b)(2) is both stingy and without any considerable support. Courts
have long struggled to interpret the advisory committee notes’ caution
that (b)(2) is not to be used to certify classes that seek “predominantly or
exclusively” money damages. Even before the addition of punitive and
compensatory damage remedies to Title VII, questions were raised about
the appropriateness of certifying an employment discrimination class
under (b)(2) when each of the individual plaintiffs sought back and front
pay – which, though classified as equitable relief, are nonetheless money
damages – in addition to the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by
the class as a whole.62 Courts were conscious that a class seeking
exclusively money damages could not be certified under (b)(2), but they
regularly concluded that the goal of civil rights litigation – to alter
discriminatory conduct – fell squarely within the purposes of (b)(2) class
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (listing among the purposes of the Act “to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination”). See also Roger M. Clegg, Introduction:
A Brief Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1459 (1994)
(noting that “[t]he impetus for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a series of six decisions handed
down by the Supreme Court in May and June of 1989”).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Sec. 2, Findings).
60. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 603.
61. See, e.g., Barefield v. Chevron, No. C 86-2427 TEH, 1988 WL 188433, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 1998); Boyd v. Bechtel, 485 F. Supp. 610, 613 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Edmondson v. Simon,
86 F.R.D. 375, 383 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
62. See, e.g., Gerald E. Rosen, Title VII Classes and Due Process: To (b)(2) or (b)(3), 26
WAYNE L. REV. 919 (1980).
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actions in spite of any request for individual relief on top of the classwide injunction.63
The majority in Allison rested its decision on an overly narrow view
of cohesiveness. The court asserted that “[t]he underlying premise of the
(b)(2) class – that its members suffer from a common injury properly
addressed by classwide relief – begins to break down when the class
seeks to recover back pay or other forms of monetary relief to be
allocated based on individual injuries.”64
This assertion cannot
withstand analysis; the common injury suffered by victims of
employment discrimination is no less “common” to the class because the
specific consequences of the discriminatory policy vary for individual
employees. If an employer has racially discriminatory policies in place,
then harm does flow to all members of a class of black employees,
regardless of the dollar amount of each individual damages claim. The
cohesiveness of the class derives from its members’ survival under the
common burden of that policy. The fact that individual members may
also have individual damage claims against the employer does not
necessarily diminish the significance of the shared burden. Nor does the
existence of individual damages claims create intragroup conflict; one
employee’s entitlement to back pay or to compensatory or punitive
damages will not conflict with or call into question the damages claims
of any other employee.
Perhaps not surprisingly in light of its weaknesses, the Allison
opinion drew a strong dissent. The dissent first expressed concern over
the majority’s bright-line rule on (b)(2) certification, which seems to
remove from future courts looking at class action employment suits the
responsibility to probe the facts of the particular case and exercise sound
discretion as to certification.65 The dissent further objected that the
majority’s rule ignored the importance of Rule 23(b)(2) class actions in
employment discrimination and other civil rights actions and threatened
to render certification in these cases impossible.66 And finally, the
dissent observed that the majority ignored the goals and structure of
Title VII class litigation:
After the 1991 Civil Rights Act the thrust of a Title VII action
continues to be society’s interest in eliminating discrimination and the
63 See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (awarding back pay in
(b)(2) employment class); Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257-58 (5th Cir. 1974)
(same).
64. Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998).
65 Id. at 426-31 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 431-32.
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individual’s interest in being made whole. Title VII plaintiffs may still
seek extensive and systematic injunctive relief for claims that arise
from a system of employment action that has been uniformly imported
based on a characteristic common to all class members, such as race.
Therefore ‘the conduct of the employer is still answerable on grounds
generally applicable to the class, and the primary relief sought is still
relief with respect to the class as a whole.’67

The dissent’s approach to evaluating the (b)(2) certification
question is very similar to that taken by the Second Circuit in Robinson
v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad. 68 The plaintiffs in Robinson were
African-American employees of Metro-North who claimed the
commuter railroad’s “company-wide policy of delegating to department
supervisors discretionary authority to make employment decisions
related to discipline and promotion” was “exercised in a racially
discriminatory manner and [had] a disparate impact on AfricanAmerican employees.”69 The representative plaintiffs sought injunctive
and equitable relief, including back and front pay, for the class as a
whole, as well as compensatory damages for members of the class who
were victims of intentional discrimination.70 The district court denied
certification, relying substantially on Allison for its conclusion that “the
multiple individual determinations of damages for the numerous
members of the class . . . would overwhelm classwide injunctive issues,
from both the standpoint of the individual plaintiffs and the standpoint of
the Court.”71 The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the district
court had abused its discretion in refusing to certify the class and that
“the changes made by the 1991 Act are not fatal to class treatment of
employment discrimination claims.”72
Like the Fifth Circuit and others, the Second Circuit focused its
inquiry in part on whether monetary relief “predominates” over
injunctive or declaratory relief. Unlike the Allison court, however, the
Second Circuit concluded that the question of predominance was one
that should be left to the discretion of the district court in the individual
case. The predominance analysis, explained the Second Circuit, should
focus on whether “the positive weight or value to the plaintiffs of the

67. Id. at 432 (quoting Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239, 251 (3d Cir.
1975) (internal quotations omitted)).
68. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 162-67 (2d Cir. 2001).
69. Id. at 155.
70. Id.
71. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 197 F.R.D. 85, 85-88 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
72. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 157.
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injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant even though
compensatory or punitive damages are also claimed.”73 The court
explained that a judge evaluating the significance of the injunctive relief
to the plaintiffs should examine whether a reasonable plaintiff would
seek injunctive or declaratory relief on the particular claim even if the
money damages were not available. Further, the court should inquire
whether the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is a ‘sham’ – that is, if
plaintiffs succeed, would the requested relief actually be necessary and
appropriate.74 If the answers to these two questions are affirmative, the
court should certify under (b)(2). Other courts have taken an approach
similar to the Second Circuit’s, urging that courts should not “read the
Rules of Civil Procedure as eviscerating the substantive rights granted
by Congress [in the 1991 Act].”75
Of course, the Second Circuit’s approach sacrifices simplicity for
flexibility.76 But many courts have declined to adopt a rule that any suit
requesting compensatory and punitive damages is inappropriate for
23(b)(2) certification, and have decided, like the Second Circuit, that the
benefits gained in flexibility and in ensuring full enforcement of civil
rights laws outweigh the efficiency concerns that weighed so heavily in
Allison.77 A number of courts and commentators have responded to the
perceived tension between the new rights granted in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 and the requirements of Rule 23(b) by arguing for different
hybrid forms of class certification.78 These hybrid classes take
advantage of the well-established process for bifurcating employment

73. Id. at 164 (remanding for certification of disparate impact claim under Rule 23(b)(2) and
consideration of pattern or practice claim for certification under the same or bifurcation) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
74 Id.
75. Reeb v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 203 F.R.D. 315, 323 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
76. See, e.g., Meghan E. Changelo, Reconciling Class Action Certification with the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 133, 151 (2003) (“While the Robinson court’s
‘ad hoc balancing’ test, with additional provisions for notice and the right to opt out, preserves the
class action device for plaintiffs bringing a Title VII employment discrimination claim, it does so at
the expense of simplicity.”).
77. Reeb, 203 F.R.D. at 323; Miller v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 202 F.R.D. 195, 199 (D.
Md. 2001); Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Alaska 2000); Hoffman
v. Honda of Am., 191 F.R.D. 530, 537 (S.D. Ohio 1999); Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D.
383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Martens v. Smith Barney, 181 F.R.D. 243, 259-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 172 F.R.D. 370, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Butler v. Home Depot,
No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370, at *13-15 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Arnold v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, 158 F.R.D. 439, 464 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
78. See Changelo, supra note 72 at 152-162; Robert M. Brava-Partain, Due Process, Rule 23
and Hybrid Classes: A Practical Solution, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1363-78 (2002) (discussing
different forms of hybrid certification).
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discrimination class litigation into a liability phase and a remedy phase.79
They also have a solid basis in provisions of Rule 23 that provide courts
with discretion to manage class litigation to ensure a balance between
systemic efficiency concerns and fairness to all parties involved in the
litigation.
Rule 23(c)(4), for example, provides that “[w]hen
appropriate . . . an action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues” or “may be divided into subclasses.”80
And 23(d) gives courts broad authority to “make appropriate orders” to
ensure efficiency, cohesiveness, and adequate representation of absent
class members.81
Relying on this authority, courts have taken a variety of approaches.
Some have concluded that the best approach in employment
discrimination class actions seeking both significant injunctive relief and
punitive and compensatory damages for individual class members is to
certify the questions of class-wide liability under 23(b)(2), and the
individual claims for relief under 23(b)(3).82 Others have chosen to
certify a class under (b)(2) or (b)(3) for liability, and to defer the
question of how to handle the damages claims.83 In each of these cases,
courts have been attentive to the due process rights of absent class
members, and many have required that plaintiffs receive notice and an
opportunity to opt out of the class to pursue their own individual
claims.84
Without endorsing one from among this variety of approaches to
handling post-1991 certification of employment discrimination class
79. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). Also see the Manual of Complex Litigation, which notes that
“the class certification may be limited to the [Rule 23](b)(2) issue (class-wide liability and
injunctive relief), with all other claims proceeding as separate actions, but contingent on the
outcome of the (b)(2) trial.” MANUAL OF COMPLEX LITIGATION, § 33.54 (3d ed. 1995).
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d).
82. See, e.g., Osgood v. Harah’s Entm’t, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 115, 128 (D.N.J. 2001).
83. See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Servs. of Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 358 (E.D. Mo.
1996); Butler, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370, at *13-15. A similar alternative would be to certify the
liability question under 23(b)(2) and simply leave individual plaintiffs to pursue their own damages
claims, but with the benefit of the liability finding, assuming the plaintiff class wins the class
litigation on liability. See Changelo, supra note 72, at 159-161.
84. See Williams v. Burlington N., 832 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1987); Fontana v. Elrod, 826
F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1987). In Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 122 (1994), the
Supreme Court intimated that when individual plaintiffs have claims for money damages, they must
be permitted to opt out of a class action and to pursue their own claim if they wish. Although many
people read the Court’s decision in Ticor Title as suggesting that suits for money damages can only
be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) because of that provision’s notice and opt-out safeguards, this
argument goes too far. Because Rule 23(d) allows courts to require notice and opt-out provisions in
the context of a particular class, it ensures that courts can protect individual rights in 23(b)(2) class
actions as well.
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actions, one can observe that the addition of compensatory and punitive
damages to the range of remedies available to successful Title VII
plaintiffs was not necessarily fatal to certification of a class.
B. The Right to a Jury Trial
A second problem that some have identified with certifying
employment discrimination class actions in the wake of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 is the newly established right to a jury trial in cases of
intentional discrimination. This argument has two different iterations:
first that a class alleging intentional discrimination cannot be divided
into a liability phase and a remedial phase, unless the same jury hears
both;85 and second, that disparate impact and disparate treatment claims
cannot be brought together in the same case because the judge’s findings
on the disparate impact claims (for which there is no jury trial right)
would inappropriately trample on the jury’s authority to find facts in the
context of the disparate treatment claim.86 Neither of these arguments
holds the power current detractors of employment discrimination classes
have assigned it.
The Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment provides
that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court
of the United States other than according to the rules of the common
law.”87 Because either party in a Title VII suit claiming intentional
discrimination may now request a jury, the requirements imposed by this
Clause will almost certainly come in to play in a disparate treatment
class action. The concern that this raises is what impact the Clause may
have on bifurcation of the liability and damages phase of the litigation,
typical for employment discrimination class litigation. Before 1991,
bifurcation of liability and damages did not present any Seventh
Amendment difficulties because Title VII suits were tried to the court,
not to a jury. With the addition of a jury trial right, bifurcation becomes
more complicated.
Some courts and commentators have argued that, in a Title VII
case, the issues of liability and damages are not sufficiently “distinct and
separable” that they can be tried to separate juries.88 As one
85 See, e.g., Keith R. Fentonmiller, Damages, Jury Trials and the Class Action Under the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 12 LAB. LAW. 421, 438 (1997).
86 See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1998).
87. U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
88. See, e.g., Fentonmiller, supra note 85, at 437-39; Piar, supra note 55, at 337-341;
Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 318 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that in order to
bifurcate liability and damages proceedings, “the issue to be tried must be so distinct and separable
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commentator has explained it: “liability and damages issues are only
‘distinct and separable’ when ‘the determination of the amount of
damages in phase two becomes little more than an application of the
formula found by the jury in phase one.’”89 In the liability phase of a
bifurcated employment class action, the individual claimants may
present evidence that goes beyond formulaic application of any findings
made by the first jury. Thus, this argument runs, in a bifurcated
employment discrimination class action, the same jury would be
required to hear not only the broad pattern-and-practice class claim, but
also the evidentiary hearings that would resolve the question of each
individual plaintiff’s entitlement to damages. This is an unworkable
solution, as it could require exceptionally lengthy jury service,
particularly in a class suit with hundreds, or even thousands, of
plaintiffs.90
The Reexamination Clause does not, however, require that liability
and damages be tried to the same jury. The Seventh Amendment does
not prohibit separate juries from considering “overlapping” evidence,
and it does not prohibit the same evidence from being presented to two
different juries, so long as the two juries do not actually decide the same
basic issues.91 What the Seventh Amendment guarantees is that separate
juries will not decide the same issue.92 In the context of an employment
discrimination class action, the question of whether an individual
plaintiff has actually been injured does not require a jury to revisit the
question of whether the defendant in fact has a discriminatory policy. In
fact, several courts have approved the bifurcated approach.93 If the jury
in the liability phase of the proceedings finds no pattern or practice of
intentional discrimination, the individual claimants are bound by that
ruling and no jury can revisit the question. Of course, the plaintiffs can,
as individuals, still bring claims alleging that they were themselves
from the other that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice” because “inherent in the Seventh
Amendment . . . is the general right of a litigant to have only one jury pass on a common issue of
fact”). But see CHARLES A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1801, at 461
(2d ed. 1986) (“[A]lthough it is preferable that the issues [of damages and liability] be presented to
the same jury, this does not seem to be constitutionally required.”).
89. Fentonmiller, supra note 85, at 439 (quoting Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage
Ass’n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1025 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled in part by International Woodworkers of
America v. Champion International Corp., 790 F.2d 1174, 1181 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986)).
90. See Wolf, supra note 57, at 1856 (noting the difficulty with extended juror service).
91. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 113 F.3d 444, 452-53 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1997); In re Innotron
Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
92. See Houseman v. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, 171 F.3d 1117, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999).
93. See Butler v. Home Depot, No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 WL 421436, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss4/5

20

Hart: Employment Discrimination Class Actions
HART4.DOC

2004]

5/14/2004 10:33 AM

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLASS ACTIONS

833

discriminated against, not because of a pattern or practice of
discrimination, but through particular behavior with regard to their
employment.94 But they cannot relitigate the question of whether the
employer had a pattern of discrimination against the particular class of
employees. Similarly, if an employer is found to have a policy or
practice of intentional discrimination, that finding is binding on the
employer in the subsequent litigation of the individual claims of
employees. The employer cannot argue that such a policy does not exist,
and therefore the second jury cannot be asked to re-investigate the issue
decided by the first jury. Instead, the second jury will be asked to find
facts about the individual employment decisions; accepting the pattern
of discrimination as a proven fact, the second jury will inquire whether
actions taken towards a particular plaintiff were the result of that policy
or not. Given this structure for a bifurcated employment class, there is
no reason a class suit alleging intentional discrimination should run afoul
of the Seventh Amendment.95
The constitutional jury trial right presents a slightly different issue
when a class alleges both disparate impact and disparate treatment
discrimination. This was the situation the court faced in Allison, where
the plaintiffs requested not a bifurcation of the liability and remedy
phases of the proceedings, but a bifurcation in which their disparate
impact claims were certified for class resolution, with the disparate
treatment claims put to the side to be handled after resolution of the
disparate impact case.96 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 guarantees a jury
trial for disparate treatment, but not for disparate impact claims.97 The
plaintiffs in Allison therefore argued that separating the proceedings and
considering only the disparate impact claims without a jury would avoid
any Seventh Amendment difficulty. The Fifth Circuit, however,
disagreed. The reason for the court’s disagreement can be found in the
94. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984).
95. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 960 F. Supp. at 205. The Court addressed this issue by
stating:
[T]he issues to be decided at the separate trials are wholly distinct. At the liability trial,
the question is whether the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
The only fact issue for the jury to decide is whether unlawful discrimination was the
employer’s regular procedure or policy. Once that issue has been decided, it is
conclusively established. At the damages trial, the question is whether the individual
class members are entitled to relief. The fact issues for the jury to decide are whether the
individual employment decisions were made pursuant to the previously established
discriminatory policy.
Id.
96. Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1998).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
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proof structures of disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. In
order to win a disparate impact claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
the employer uses some policy or practice that has a negative impact on
a protected class.98
The employer can then avoid liability by
demonstrating that the challenged practice is job related and reasonably
necessary to the employer’s business.99 In a disparate treatment case, the
employer, confronted with plaintiffs’ prima facie case of discrimination,
must articulate some legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action.100 Considering these two proof structures,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that:
It is the rare case indeed in which a challenged practice is job-related
and a business necessity, yet not a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for an adverse employment action taken pursuant to that
practice. Thus, a finding that a challenged practice is job-related and a
business necessity in response to a disparate impact claim strongly, if
not wholly, implicates a finding that the same practice is a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the employer’s actions in a pattern or
practice claim.101

The court thus determined that “significant overlap of factual issues is
almost inevitable whenever disparate impact and pattern or practice
claims are joined in the same action.”102 The Fifth Circuit’s concern,
which has been echoed elsewhere, certainly raises a potential barrier to
structuring class litigation in the manner proposed by the Allison
plaintiffs. But it does not pose an impediment to class litigation of
employment discrimination claims as a general matter. Moreover, the
problem identified by the Fifth Circuit would be eliminated by allowing
the jury to consider the disparate treatment claims before a judge
considered the allegations of disparate impact discrimination. If the
claims are pursued in that order, “a jury will resolve common factual
disputes and its resolution will control when the judge takes up” the
disparate impact claim.103 As with the objections to consideration of
punitive and compensatory damages in class litigation, the difficulties
posed by the 1991 Act’s jury trial provision are simply not sufficient to
kill the employment discrimination class.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i).
99. Id.
100. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (setting forth proof
structure in a disparate treatment case).
101. Allison, 151 F.3d at 424.
102. Id.
103. Allen v. Int’l Truck and Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 2004).
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III. WHAT IS GOING ON HERE?
Those courts and commentators who have concluded that
employment discrimination class actions are essentially impossible in
light of the 1991 Civil Rights Act are dramatically overstating the
problems created by that law’s added remedies. But the impulse to
curtail the availability of employment discrimination class actions is
obviously strong, and it is interesting to explore what might lie behind
this impulse. I believe that a number of factors have contributed to the
decline in popularity of the employment discrimination class: hostility to
class litigation generally; a perception that class action suits are no
longer needed in the employment context; and a deep anxiety about the
substance of the claims being brought in these class suits.
A. The Perception that Class Actions are Unfair
Like the “trial lawyer,” the class action is an unpopular creature
right now. Although the number of class actions being filed around the
country seems to be growing, the criticisms of class actions are growing
even faster, and many commentators have observed “a significant and
increasing hostility to the class action mechanism” as “a broad trend in
American courts today.”104 Lawyers, judges, academics, and the media
complain that class actions are used to force settlement of meritless
claims; that they are primarily tools of collusion between defendants and
plaintiffs’ counsel; and that absent plaintiffs are not adequately
represented by plaintiffs’ counsel who seek only whatever resolution
will maximize their attorney’s fees.105 As one lawyer has put it:
Class actions are supposed to be an efficient way to resolve in one
lawsuit similar legal claims held by numerous people. Instead, class
action litigation has become a money-making bonanza for plaintiffs’
104. Stephen D. Susman, Class Actions: Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 (2003). See also Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377,
1377 (2000) (“[C]lass actions are without doubt the most controversial subject in the civil process
today.”).
105. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003) (“Thus,
what purports to be a class action, brought primarily to enforce private individuals’ substantive
rights to compensatory relief, in reality amounts to little more than private attorneys acting as
bounty hunters . . . .”); Piar, supra note 55, at 343-44 (arguing that the goals of class actions “are
routinely trampled in class litigation. Class actions are frequently settled for reasons having nothing
to do with their merits: faced with potentially overwhelming liability, bad publicity, and enormous
legal fees (even if it prevails), an employer may capitulate and settle the case even though it may
lack merit and even though it may ultimately not be maintainable as a class action.”).
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lawyers, who often persuade state courts to sanction sweetheart
settlements that result in million-dollar fees for the lawyers but provide
little or no actual benefit to their clients, the actual class members.106

At the heart of these complaints rest primarily two concerns: the
first is a concern that the rights of plaintiffs – particularly unnamed
plaintiffs – are not being protected, and especially that the class action
device may be denying these plaintiffs their constitutionally protected
right to due process.107 The second is a concern that defendants are
being coerced into large settlements in cases without any real merit.108
These concerns have spawned various proposals for reform of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 within the federal legislature.109 And they
have filled pages and pages of academic journals with criticism of every
aspect of class litigation.110 But, whatever the merits of these criticisms
might be in the context of mass tort or other similar class litigation, they
are largely inapt as applied to employment discrimination claims.

106. Civil Procedure – Class Actions, Fair Federal Forums Should Decide Interstate Class
Actions, U.S. LAW WK., Aug. 29, 2000.
107. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 163 (2003) (“A staple of the class action literature is the
recognition that class counsel might embrace a settlement inadequate for all, many, or some class
members.”).
108. As George Priest recently noted:
[A]ccording to common belief . . . there are no mass tort class actions that are ever
litigated. They are all settled. There is no success rate one way of another for plaintiffs
or defendants in mass tort class actions because, once a class action is certified, because
of the assured destructive capability of that class action [in the mass tort context] the
defendants always settle.
George Priest, The Economics of Class Actions, 9 KAN. J. LAW & PUB. POL. 481, 482 (2000).
Priest observed that circumstances are “quite different in the context of civil rights class actions
where damages are not at issue.” Id. If, however, the argument is that damages have become an
issue post-1991, then his point regarding class certification and its effect on settlement may apply in
employment cases.
109. Every year for the past several years, Congress has considered proposals to federalize
class actions. The most recent such proposal was the Class Action Fairness Act. H.R. 1115, 108th
Cong. (2003); S. 274, 108th Cong. (2003). The House and Senate bills are essentially the same. See
generally David R. Clay, Federal Attraction for the Interstate Class Action: The Effect on Devlin v.
Scardelletti and the Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) on Class Action
“Minimal Diversity” Concerns, 52 EMORY L. J. 1877, 1883-84 (2003) (providing a brief overview
of legislative efforts to modify class action requirements). In addition, new provisions of Rule 23
took force in December 2003 that directly address attorney’s fees and appointment of class counsel.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), (g).
110. The number of articles on class litigation is much too high to cite realistically. However,
as Martin Redish recently noted, citing a few well-known articles: “Much of the scholarly
commentary has been highly critical of the modern class action.” See Redish, supra note 105, at 73.
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1. Blackmail Settlements
The perception that class actions are used to force defendants to
settle meritless cases has led many courts to take a more dubious look at
the class actions presented to them.111 Courts themselves now refer to
settlements in the class action context as “blackmail settlements,”112
“legalized blackmail,”113 and “judicial blackmail.”114 As the Eleventh
Circuit put it, reversing a grant of certification to a class of Jewish
customers who alleged they had been denied corporate contracts by Avis
Rent-a-Car, “there is nothing to be gained by certifying this case as a
class action; nothing, that is except the blackmail value of a class
certification that can aid the plaintiffs in coercing the defendant into a
settlement.”115
This perspective has become so pervasive that
“‘[h]ydraulic pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized objection to
class certification.”116
The impact of judicial hostility to class actions is exacerbated by
the interlocutory review provisions of the relatively new Rule 26(f),
which allows an appellate court to grant an immediate review of a
district court’s certification decision.117 The rule itself does not provide
clear standards for when appellate courts should grant interlocutory
review. However, a number of courts of appeals have concluded that
111. In an exceptionally interesting article, Charles Silver, Codirector for the Center on
Lawyers, Civil Justice and the Media at the University of Texas School of Law, has set forth a
detailed evaluation of the different theories articulated by judges in support of the “blackmail”
thesis. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1357, 1357 (2003).
112. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 867 (1995).
113. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 78485 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
114. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996). See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Aggregating millions of
claims on account of multiple products manufactured and sold across more than ten years makes the
case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at a price
that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the actual merit of the
claims.”); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2002); Parker v. Time Warner
Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We acknowledge Judge Glasser’s legitimate concern
that the potential for a devastatingly large damages award, out of all reasonable proportion to the
actual harm suffered by members of the plaintiff class . . . [may produce] an in terrorem effect on
defendants, which may induce unfair settlements.”); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 168
(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “granting certification may generate unwarranted pressure to settle
nonmeritorious or marginal claims”).
115. Rutstein v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000).
116. See Silver, supra note 111, at 1358 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 164
(3d Cir. 2001)).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
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such review would be appropriate when a district court’s certification of
the class would make settlement all but a certainty because the defendant
would feel that settlement was its only option.118 In fact, Judge
Easterbrook has argued that “[p]ermitting appellate review before class
certification can precipitate such a settlement is a principal function of
Rule 23(f).”119 Thus, Rule 23(f) gives appellate judges an opportunity to
reverse the decisions of district courts where they perceive the class
action as too costly to the defendant.120 In practice, Rule 26(f) has
become “a one-way ratchet for defendants.”121
While these criticisms of class actions have traditionally been
applied primarily to mass tort litigation and other similar suits, some
commentators have argued that the changes wrought by the 1991 Civil
Rights Act have created the same kinds of problems in the context of
employment discrimination class litigation. The idea is that the
increased damages available – up to $300,000 for each plaintiff in a
disparate treatment suit – has dramatically increased “the risk that the
monetary exposure presented by the availability of compensatory and
punitive damages to each class member will force defendants to settle
regardless of any wrongdoing.”122 Indeed, the Allison court quite
explicitly expressed concern about the possibility that certification in
that case might be used to force settlement. In affirming the district

118. See, e.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1999).
Courts also find interlocutory review appropriate when a district court denial of certification would
make prosecution of individual cases unlikely because of the costs to each individual plaintiff and
when a new legal question is presented in the context of the certification. See id. at 835. See also In
re Sumito Copper Litig. v. Credit Lyonnairse Rouse, Ltd., 262 F.3d 134, 138-40 (2d Cir. 2001);
Newton, 259 F.3d at 163-65; Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255 F.3d 138, 143-46 (4th Cir. 2001).
119. Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1016. See West, 282 F.3d at 937 (“The effect of a
class certification in inducing settlement to curtail the risk of large awards provides a powerful
reason to take an interlocutory appeal.”).
120. See, e.g., Susman, supra note 104, at 5 (“Rule 23(f) essentially gives an appellate court
complete license to retry the certification question and substitute its judgment for that of the trial
judge.”).
121. Silver, supra note 111, at n.8. See Jennifer K. Fardy, Disciplining the Class:
Interlocutory Review of Class Action Certification Decisions Under Rule 23(f), 13 A.B.A. SEC.
LITIG. COMM. ON CLASS ACTIONS & DERIVATIVE SUITS 3, 9 (2003) (reporting that as of that time,
federal circuit courts had granted thirty-two petitions for interlocutory review, and that no 23(f)
appeal had led to the reversal of a district court’s denial of class certification).
122. Piar, supra note 55, at 343. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory
Council at 17, Home Depot U.S.A. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 (Mar. 3, 1997)
(No. 96-943) (“Once a class is certified, setting up the prospect for huge litigation expenses and
creating the risk of a billion dollar judgment, cases are likely to settle before the merits of the claims
of discrimination are even explored. In the end, nobody knows whether the employer discriminated
or not—only that it paid a lot of money to get out of a no-win situation in which it never should
have been placed.”).
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court’s denial of certification, the Fifth Circuit cautioned: “we should
not condone a certification-at-all-costs approach to this case for the
simple purpose of forcing a settlement. Settlements should reflect the
relative merits of the parties’ claims, not a surrender to the vagaries of an
utterly unpredictable and burdensome litigation procedure.”123
The powerful effect of this fear that class certification will operate
as judicially sanctioned blackmail requires more consideration of the
merits of the claims underlying the fear. Is it accurate, in general, and
particularly in the context of employment discrimination suits, that class
certification will compel defendants to settle meritless cases? There is
substantial persuasive evidence that the claim is “unsupported on any
basis currently articulated in judicial opinions or legal scholarship.” 124
For example, in an empirical study, researchers for the Federal Judicial
Center found that “rulings on motions and [established] case
management practices limit[] the ability of a party to coerce a settlement
without regard to the merits of the case,” and that there is not support for
the claim that “the certification decision itself, as opposed to the merits
of the underlying claims, coerce[s] settlements with any frequency.”125
Those who raise the specter of the blackmail settlement often point
to multi-million dollar settlements in employment discrimination cases
to make their point.126 But these large settlements cannot, without more
information, support the charge that employment class suits are being
settled by inappropriate coercion.127 The fact of a large settlement is
123. Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 n.17 (5th Cir. 1998).
124. Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of
Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297, 298 (2002). See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 104, at 1379
(concluding that “the risks of . . . blackmail settlements have been overstated”); David Rosenberg,
Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393,
430 (2000) (expressing “doubt that litigation class actions. . . exert systemic blackmail pressure
against defendants”); Silver, supra note 111, at 1359 (“[M]any academics deny that class actions
give claimants excessive leverage over defendants.”).
125. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES 61 (1996).
126. See, e.g., Shively, supra note 29, at 925 & n.1, 927 & n.16; Piar, supra note 55, at 335 &
nn.120 & 122. (suggesting that district courts may certify with the specific intent to force settlement
and mentioning two large employment discrimination class actions that settled after initial
certification of the class).
127. Many of the well-known recent settlements were in suits brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC prosecutes a relatively small number of cases
each year, and has a thorough process in place to evaluate the merits of claims. It seems unlikely
that the EEOC would be forcing settlement of claims lacking any valid basis. In any event,
settlement of EEOC cases cannot support any claim that Rule 23 certification of private
employment classes is inappropriate, as the EEOC is not obligated to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 23 in bringing a pattern-and-practice claim against an employer. See supra note 13.
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only evidence of a “blackmail class” if there was no good basis on the
merits for the defendant to settle. Quite to the contrary, the factual
background of some of the most infamous recent employment
discrimination class settlements suggest that the defendants were wise to
settle not because of the coercive effects of class certification but
because the plaintiffs had strong evidence on the merits of their
claims.128
It seems likely that the perception that employment discrimination
class actions are bad things is part of the:
general misperception, one that has been fueled by the popular antiemployment discrimination rhetoric often financed by conservative
interest groups, [that] strongly influences courts’ perception of the
cases. This general misperception is that employment cases are easy –
not difficult – to win, and the volume of discrimination cases is said to
reflect an excessive amount of costly nuisance suits.129

The conviction that plaintiffs easily win employment discrimination
suits and that settlement is being coerced certainly increases hostility to
these claims. In fact, employment discrimination cases are quite
difficult for plaintiffs to win.130 The empirical evidence suggesting how
128. This is not the forum for cataloging all of the employment discrimination claims that have
settled with significant press in recent years. But, a couple of examples might be instructive. One
of the most famous race discrimination settlements in U.S. employment litigation was the payment
that Texaco made to members of a class of African American employees in 1996. At that time, the
upper management of Texaco was almost entirely white; no black employee had ever held a job in
the highest pay grade; and of 873 high paid executives, only six were black. Kurt Eichenwald, The
Two Faces of Texaco, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at A1. While the suit was pending, executives of
Texaco held a meeting (allegedly to discuss the destruction of documents that they did not want to
turn over in discovery) that was tape-recorded by someone in attendance. The tape of that meeting
appears to show a number of executives using racial epithets. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco
Executives, On Tape, Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at A1. Texaco
settled the suit, paying members of the class $115 million in damages and promising to spend
considerable sums to improve the pay structure and climate for African American employees at
Texaco. See Press Release, Texaco, Texaco Announces Settlement in Class Action Lawsuit (Nov.
15, 1996), available at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/diversity/. In another extremely recent
example, occurring in early February of 2004, United Airlines settled a suit for $36.5 million with a
group of former female flight attendants. The flight attendants had charged the airline with
discrimination because United had imposed weight restrictions that required women to weigh up to
27 pounds less than men of the same height. See Associated Press, United Airlines ordered to Pay
$36.5 Million to Settle Sex-Discrimination Lawsuit, (Feb. 12, 2004). United’s weight restrictions
had been declared facially discriminatory just four years earlier, so the settlement in this most recent
case seems quite tied to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. See Frank v. United Air Lines, 216 F.3d
845 (9th Cir. 2000).
129. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L.
REV. 555, 556 (2001).
130. See generally Selmi, supra note 129; see also David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts
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difficult it is for a plaintiff to win an employment discrimination claim
raises further questions about the legitimacy of “blackmail settlement”
fears in this context.
2. The Rights of Absent Class Members
The second concern that has fueled substantial criticism of class
action litigation in recent years is the possibility that the rights of absent
class members are being ignored by the attorneys representing the
class.131 In employment discrimination class actions, concerns about
absent class members are less significant because the definition of the
class itself should ensure relatively easy notice procedures. In an
employment suit, the class members are defined by their relationship to
one particular employer. Given the Supreme Court’s imperative in
Falcon that courts pay careful attention to the requirements of Rule
23(a),132 class members may be defined even more narrowly to include
only those employees in a particular geographic location. Reaching
employees, and even former employees, will rarely present the kinds of
notice problems that may exist in mass tort class suits, and that have
contributed to the current criticisms. Of course, courts may ensure that
notice is actually provided to absent class members. And it may be that
in intentional discrimination suits, in which the plaintiffs seek
compensatory and punitive damages, class members must be given an
opportunity to opt out of the class and pursue their own claims. A
number of courts certifying employment discrimination classes have
reached this conclusion,133 and their attention to the issue raises further
doubts about the legitimacy of this concern as a barrier to certification.
B. The Perception that Class Actions in Employment are Unnecessary
A second factor that may explain the willingness to effectively
eliminate employment discrimination class actions is the widely held
belief that class actions are no longer necessary to full enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws. Prior to 1991, private systemic discrimination
Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge
Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511,
516-18 (2003).
131. See Nagareda, supra note 107, at 163; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Darren Carter, Notice and the Protection of
Class Members’ Interests, 69 S. CAL. L REV. 1121 (1996).
132. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., cases cited in note 78.
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suits were generally recognized as central tools in fighting unlawful
behavior. Since 1991, however, a number of judges and academics have
suggested that private employment discrimination classes are no longer
essential for a number of reasons: 1) because the 1991 law increased the
value of individual plaintiffs’ claims, and therefore made individual suits
more likely; 2) because individual suits can seek the same kind of
injunctive relief that class action litigation would secure, and therefore
make the kinds of sweeping change that class actions have traditionally
been valued for doing; and 3) because the EEOC can bring pattern-andpractice claims where class litigation might be necessary, thus
eliminating the need for the private class suit.134
While the “need” for class litigation of a claim may not be a
justification for certifying a class, the perceived absence of that need
certainly makes it easier to deny certification. In fact, Rule 23(b)(3)
specifically requires judges to evaluate whether a class suit will be
“superior to other methods for adjudication.”135 Certification under
23(b)(2) does not require the same evaluation, but it seems likely that
judges considering whether to certify a class are moved in some part by
their sense of the effectiveness or value of class litigation as compared to
the alternatives.
Since the perception that class litigation is not needed may decrease
the likelihood of certification, it becomes particularly important to
understand whether the claims apparently demonstrating the diminished
need for class litigation have support. To the contrary, much available
evidence suggests that private class litigation is very much needed in the
employment context. Perhaps most significantly, after losing the
certification battle in these cases, plaintiffs often do not go on to pursue
their own individual claims of discrimination.136 Thus, class litigation of
employment discrimination claims appears to allow individuals who
would not otherwise challenge employer policies and decisions to do
so.137
Moreover, the structure of proof in class action and government
pattern-and-practice employment discrimination claims is different from

134. See, e.g., Piar, supra note 55, at 346.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
136. Stamps, supra note 56, at 445.
137. Id. at 445-46. Stamps suggests several possible explanations for individual decisions not
to pursue their own claims. The expense of the suits, and uncertainties over the award of attorney’s
fees may make individual cases too risky for attorneys and therefore potential plaintiffs may be
unable to find representation. Individual claimants may also wish to avoid personal involvement in
litigation and the personal and professional hazards that attend suing an employer. Id.
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the structure of proof in individual discrimination suits.138 Because
plaintiffs in individual suits do not have a “private, non-class cause of
action for pattern or practice discrimination,” under Title VII,139 the
kinds of evidence they must bring forward to survive summary judgment
are different from the evidence that would support a showing of a pattern
of discrimination in the workforce. While a group of plaintiffs may be
able to demonstrate that the employer operates a pattern of
discrimination, this does not guarantee that any individual plaintiff will
be able to prove that the particular decisions made regarding her
employment were tainted by discrimination. An employer could,
therefore, operate with a pattern of discrimination, yet still win one or
more individual suits, depending completely on the identity of the
particular plaintiff who chooses to file suit. Further, although plaintiffs
in individual cases may present evidence of widespread discrimination
in order to support their claims, the Federal Rules of Evidence may
impose limits on what courts will allow an individual plaintiff to present
about circumstances at a workplace that do not relate directly to any
adverse action taken against that employee.140 And finally, the relief
sought in individual cases typically differs from the relief sought in
government or private class cases.141 The fact that an individual plaintiff
may request an injunction that will benefit others in the same protected
class as that plaintiff simply does not make individual discrimination
suits as effective as class litigation in addressing patterns of
discrimination.
138. See, e.g., Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir. 2001);
Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 760 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds,
119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Comm., 773 F.2d 857, 866-67 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“Plaintiffs’ use of ‘pattern-or- practice’ language also seems to be misplaced, since such suits, by
their very nature, involve claims of classwide discrimination, and the five plaintiffs, while attacking
policies that would have affected all of Jewel’s women employees as a class, have stated only their
individual claims, not a class action.”) (citations omitted); Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 676
F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. 1982) (“This is not a ‘pattern and practice suit’ by the government . . .
[n]or is this a private class action . . . [a]n individual proceeding as an individual under Title VII
must prove the elements of a discriminatory hiring claim as set forth in McDonnell Douglas.”);
Axel v. Apfel, No. WMN 97-1614, 2000 WL 1593446, at *6 (D. Md. 2000); Herendeen v. Mich.
State Police, 39 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (W.D. Mich 1999).
139. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 760.
140. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
141. See, e.g., Lowery, 158 F.3d at 161 (“Class action pattern or practice suits differ from
disparate treatment suits in the nature of their remedies . . . . [T]he relief typically sought in class
action pattern or practice suits is injunctive and may include such aspects as, for example,
affirmative action plans and the altering of a seniority system. See 1 Larson, Employment
Discrimination § 8.01[3], at 8-14 (2d ed.1994) . . . . On the other hand, in a private, non-class
disparate treatment case . . . the relief typically sought involves reinstatement, hiring, back-pay,
[and] damages.”).
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Reliance on the EEOC to pursue systemwide discrimination is also
a poor substitute for the “private attorney general” scheme that has long
been central to enforcement of a variety of federal civil rights laws. The
EEOC is a government agency, subject to the limitations on funding and
the political uncertainties of any such entity. Moreover, the EEOC has
often been criticized for its poor enforcement record.142 And, even
operating under the best of circumstances, the agency was not designed
to challenge every instance of discrimination in U.S. employment.
When Congress enacted Title VII, the legislature specifically intended
that enforcement of the law would be split between private and
governmental action. Indeed, one author has argued that “the crucial
innovation in the 1964 Civil Rights Act was the enlargement of the role
of the individual right to sue in the federal courts, rather than the
enhancement of administrative agency powers.”143 To abandon a
significant part of the private side of this enforcement structure is to
thwart that intent.
C. The Concern that the Underlying Substantive Claims may Lack Merit
I suspect that another factor affecting certification decisions, and
contributing to criticisms of class litigation in employment cases, is the
substance of the underlying claims. Many employment discrimination
class claims today include allegations that the employer used excessively
subjective decisionmaking processes that led to discrimination
throughout the workplace.144 Indeed, both Allison and Robinson
involved primarily these subjective decisionmaking claims.145 These
claims are certainly cognizable under Title VII. More than 20 years ago,
when the Supreme Court recognized a possible exception to the ban on
across-the-board discrimination claims, it observed that “significant
proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination
conceivably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the
discrimination manifested itself in the same general fashion, such as
through entirely subjective decisionmaking processes.”146 But the
142. See, e.g., Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
457, 479-82 (1991); David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where do We Stand on Equal
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1989).
143. ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 4 (1971) (citation
omitted).
144. See Kramer, supra note 31, at 417 (“Allegations of employers’ ‘excessively subjective’
decisionmaking frequently form the basis of these class actions.”).
145. See Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1998); Robinson v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001).
146. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
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availability of a claim for excessively subjective decisionmaking has not
translated into judicial comfort with the claim.147 Many courts reject the
claim all together, or acknowledge that a group of plaintiffs could in
theory present sufficient evidence to make out the claim, but that the bar
would be extremely high.148
Although the Supreme Court long ago held that courts should not
consider the merits when evaluating whether to certify a class,149 there is
plenty of evidence that courts do not, and cannot, entirely separate the
merits from the certification decision. Consideration of the merits of a
claim may come up in several ways during the certification process.
First, several of the Rule 23(a) factors are sufficiently intertwined with
questions about the merits of the particular claim that it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for courts to avoid some evaluation of the
merits in determining whether to certify a class.150 For example, the
requirements of typicality, commonality and adequacy may raise doubts
in a judge’s mind about whether the underlying claims will be provable
at all. Second, judges may simply conduct a quick evaluation of the
claims being pushed by the plaintiff class and may, consciously or
unconsciously, import their views about the merits into their evaluation
of certification.
Several commentators have argued that it may not be such a terrible
thing for courts to consider the merits of these claims in reaching their
certification decisions.151 I agree that there may be reason to give a
147. For a more extended discussion of this issue, see Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking
in Employment Discrimination: Are There Problems Law Can’t Solve? (forthcoming, on file with
author).
148. See, e.g., Denney v. Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is inconceivable
that Congress intended antidiscrimination statutes to deprive an employer of the ability to rely on
important criteria in its employment decisions merely because those criteria are only capable of
subjective evaluation.”); Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Nothing in
Title VII bans outright the use of subjective evaluation criteria.”); Weihaupt v. Am. Med. Ass’n,
874 F.2d 419, 429 (7th Cir. 1989); Dorsch v. L.B. Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1427 (7th Cir. 1986);
Vitug v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 88 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 1986) (“But arbitrariness alone does
not amount to discrimination. It is not enough for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an employment
practice could theoretically be used to discriminate—Title VII does not forbid subjective selection
processes.”); Richter v. Revco D.S., Inc., 959 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Ind. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Richter
v. Hook-Superx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1998).
149. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
150. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1266 (2002) (“In fact, judges sometimes do probe behind the allegations
and examine supporting evidence to determine whether Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied.”).
151. See Priest, supra note 108, at 483 (“If the economic power of the certification of the class
is such that, if certified, the defendant will settle on some terms, then it seems to me that it’s
necessary in order to achieve the goals of justice in our society, to evaluate the merits of the claims
as to whether the claims have sufficient merit on their face without a lot of discovery and to
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quick look at the merits of the underlying claims before sending the
parties and the court through the enormous expense of litigation. But
more importantly, if courts do, as I suspect they do, already consider the
merits in reaching their certification decisions, that fact should be
acknowledged. It would be better to have frank discussion about the
substantive claims themselves than to hide that discussion in a Rule 23
analysis that cannot benefit the development of either the procedural or
the substantive law.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the Fifth Circuit decided Allison almost six years ago, civil
rights advocates feared that its bright-line rule against certification of
employment discrimination class actions would take hold throughout the
country and would signal the end of one of the primary mechanisms for
enforcement of Title VII. In fact, while some courts have adopted
analyses similar to the Fifth Circuit’s, decisions like that of the Second
Circuit in Robinson have provided an attractive alternative interpretation
of the interaction between Rule 23 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
But, even though Allison did not herald the demise of the employment
discrimination class, the opinion raises interesting questions about
current judicial attitudes to class action litigation, both in employment
discrimination and more generally. The current hostility to class
litigation rests on a number of assumptions that do not withstand
scrutiny, at least in employment discrimination suits. Unfortunately, the
inaccuracy of these assumptions does not diminish the powerful impact
that hostility to class litigation might have on the development of both
Rule 23 doctrine and the underlying substantive guarantees of the civil
rights laws.

examine whether the claims have sufficient potential merit to justify the creation of great economic
power through class certification.”); Bartlett H. Maguire, The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class
Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366, 368-70 (1996);
Douglas M. Towns, Merit-Based Class Action Certification: Old Wine in a New Bottle, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1001, 1028-29 (1992) (arguing for permitting consideration of the merits as part of the
certification decision).
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